Yalta + 80

 

The most famous of the several Allied World War II summit conferences began 80 years ago today, February 4, 1945, at Yalta in Soviet Crimea.  Stalin, the great winner in the European war, insisted on his Allies' coming to him. Hence, the terminally ill President Roosevelt's 14,000 mile trip to Soviet Crimea, to which he referred in his last speech to Congress, which was also his only acknowledgment of his disability in public.

Especially during the Cold War, the legacy of the week-long Yalta Conference was much debated. It seems to me that two things can be true at the same time. On the one hand, President Roosevelt seemed to have a higher than was warranted view of his own ability to charm Stalin. His aide Harry Hopkins seemed to be much more trusting of the Soviets than seemed warranted. And both would have done better to have taken Churchill's worries about Soviet expansionism more seriously. Certainly Stalin, both before and after Yalta, exploited these weaknesses in his Allies. At the same time, however, it remains true that the Western Allies depended for much of the war on the Russians to hold off the Germans in the East and only opened a second front in the West in 1944. The Soviet Union lost some 27 million dead during the war against Germany, compared to the much more modest Allied death toll. Everyone at Yalta had to be aware of that disparity and equally aware of the Soviet determination to guarantee its future security in eastern Europe, as a buffer against any future German invasion. And, of course, everyone also knew that that Soviets now occupied the countries they had liberated from the Germans - including eventually part of Germany itself. Add to that the nearly universal expectation that the U.S. would again abandon Europe in two years, which only added to Churchill's wariness, and the Allied desire to get Soviet support in the still continuing war against Japan, which turned out to be unnecessary in the end but which no one foresaw at the time. All of that makes it difficult to imagine an outcome all that different from what emerged at the end of the Yalta conference.

That said, the resulting division of Europe proved disastrous, an outcome famously described by Churchill a year later as an "Iron Curtain." (I remember as a child hearing that phrase on the nightly radio news and wondering what an "Iron Curtain" might look like.) After ostensibly opposing the Cold War's division of Europe for decades, while largely accepting it in practice, the West finally legitimized it in the Helsinki Agreement (the "Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe") in 1975, which ironically and completely unexpectedly in turn set in motion the Human Rights movement that contributed eventually to to undoing of Soviet dominance in eastern Europe and of Communism itself in the Soviet Union.

Against all odds, Churchill hoped for a restored European balance of power. Hence his support for a re-empowered France and a genuinely independent Poland. He got the former, but, although the UK had gone to war in 1939 ostensibly to guarantee Poland's territorial integrity, he lost the latter. It is debatable whether, if FDR had been more willing to be more confrontational with Stalin (had he not still wanted to gain favor with Stalin to get his support for the United Nations and his assistance in the Pacific War), whether that might have made a difference. The fact remains that the Soviets were already in control of Poland militarily. While General George Patton did propose that the Allies finish the job, so to speak, by going to war against the Soviets in eastern Europe, neither the U.S. nor its Allies were realistically ready for or politically disposed to undertake such a military adventure in 1945, which is what it would have taken to dislodge the Soviets from Poland. In fact, Stalin only pushed his advantage up to a point. He honored his earlier agreement with Churchill about Greece and did not try to advance further west in Norway or Denmark. But where it mattered most (the buffer states between Germany and Russia) and where he already had the military upper hand, Stalin pressed his advantage, and there was little the western Allies could have done to alter Stalin's strategy.

Those old debates are now the stuff of history, but they defined the politics of the post-war world, and can still teach us some important lessons. What, for example, would a realistic Ukrainian settlement look like? Like Stalin in post-war Europe, Putin seems unlikely to be dislodged from either Crimea or eastern Ukraine. That may be lamentable, but it seems inescapable. The unforgettable lesson of Yalta remains one of the oldest lessons of international politics - that the correlation of forces on the ground remains one of the primary (if not always the primary) factor to be considered in any negotiation. 

In the end, Yalta paved the path for a military stalemate in Europe, with the continent (and the symbolic city of Berlin) left divided between east and west, with both sides tacitly accepting the division and unwilling to push each other too far. Perhaps that is what we can best hope for in international politics, and we must then count ourselves fortunate to have been born on the western side of that division.