When Harvard's Samuel Huntington authored American Politics: The Politics of Disharmony in 1981, the Soviet Union still stood (seemingly) strong, and American politics still predictably performed more or less according to Americans' Cold War era norms and expectations. As I acknowledged in my belated review of Huntington's book on this site (December 20, 2024), in 1981 I was at the end of my political science career and so managed to miss reading the book - until the transformed political world of 2024 finally inspired me to read it and apply its analysis to today. It is, as I wrote in 2024, "An Old Book for a New Day."
Huntington highlighted the traditionally "creedal" character of American identity. He highlighted the high degree of consensus among Americans about the "American Creed," especially among those more active in the system and who benefit the most from it." On the other hand, those "who have less income and less education and who do not occupy leadership roles are more likely to be hypocritical or moralistic and lower status people cynical or complacent."
Huntington's emphasis was mainly on the periodic eras of moralistic reforms, what he called "creedal passion periods," which occur periodically through American history, approximately every 60 years. He identified four such periods in particular: the American Revolution, the Jacksonian era, the Progressive era, and the 1960s-1970s. The general direction of these efforts was "to make political institutions more responsive, more liberal, more democratic." Reforms have not, however, been unambiguously successful. "The reforms of one generation often produce the vested interests of the next."
By Huntington's calculation, "a major sustained creedal passion period will occur in the second and third decades of the twenty-first century" - i.e., right about now. There can be little doubt that the decade of Donald Trump has already initiated precisely such a crisis, in which not only elements of the "American Creed" but its very viability as the primary vehicle for the expression of American identity has come into question. Unlike earlier periods, when the conflict was not so much between rival ideas as between the ruling ideas and the facts found in existing American institutions, a conflict has evidently emerged between conflicting ideas themselves, as the very character of American identity as "creedal" has come. under sustained intellectual and political attack.
Huntington already in 1981 recognized the possibility that in the future (which is now the present) other forces could "change, dilute, or eliminate the central ideals of the American Creed."
Bringing his analysis forward, Huntington foresaw several possibilities. First, the core creedal values, which derive from the 17th and 18th centuries, could "come to be seen as increasingly irrelevant in a complex modern economy and a threatening international environment," an irrelevance potentially exacerbated by rising secularism. "As religious passion weakens, how likely is the United States to sustain a firm commitment to its traditional values? Would an America without its Protestant core still be America?"
Second, the transition to post-industrial society could be accompanied by an increasingly "communitarian" ideology, in place of Lockean individualism. Third, the increasing influence of recent immigrants could similarly also dilute that Lockean tradition. Early 20th-century immigrants "introduced a different 'ethic' into American cities." Likewise, "the more recent immigrants could well introduce into American society values markedly in contrast with Lockean liberalism." Obviously, immigration is a contentious issue at present. Even when occasionally masked as a concern about the introduction of alternative ideas which might or might not be compatible with the traditional "American Creed" (as was the case with the 19th-century "Know-Nothing" opposition to Catholic immigrants), the intense animus against immigrants currently dominant in our politics is obviously racially structured. That said, it it obviously also true that, like the earlier Catholic and Jewish immigrants, more recent immigrants may also bring with them ideas and values that may challenge (as well as in many case affirm) elements of the traditional "American Creed."
Finally, having been in existence as a nation for over 200 years (now almost 250), Huntington suggested that the U.S. may experience less need fo its founding ideals as a primary definition of its national identity. "History, tradition, custom culture and a sense of shared experience such as other major nations have developed over the centuries could also come to define American identity, and the role of abstract ideals and values might be reduced." (This is roughly the position JD Vance famously articulated in his 2024 Convention acceptance speech.) What Huntington calls "the ideational basis of national identity" might "be replaced by an organic one, and 'American exceptionalism' would wither." Instead of "a nation with the soul of a church," the U.S. could "become a nation with the soul of a nation." In other words, we may be becoming "like all other nations" (cf. 1 Samuel 8:5).
Obviously other nations are not bad, and being more like them is not necessarily all that bad either. What is (at least possibly) problematic is the loss of the previously unifying character of the "American Creed," which (among other things) made immigration work so successfully for the U.S. in ways it may not work for other more organic countries.
Given the dramatic and unprecedented political and cultural changes that have characterized the Trump decade, the possibilities Huntington foresaw appear somewhat prophetic.
Huntington nonetheless recognized the "tremendous persistence and resiliency" of classical American values and ideals. Likewise, increasingly cultural pluralism could also play a supportive role in sustaining those values and ideals. The more pluralistic the nation, "the more essential the values of the Creed become in defining what it is that Americans have in common." That is, of course largely what happened after the previous periods of mass immigration. It is probably one of the processes at work among immigrant communities even now and would likely be the predominant process, were it not for the forceful opposition of the current racialized, radical anti-immigrant alternative constituency.
Given these diverse possibilities, Huntington envisioned different possible futures. The one he considered most dangerous, however, may perhaps prove to be the one most relevant for our present predicament. Huntington notes "the continued presence of deeply felt moralistic sentiments among major groups in American society could continue to ensure weak and divided government, devoid of authority and unable to deal satisfactorily with the economic, social, and foreign challenges confronting the nation. Intensification of this conflict between history and progress could give rise to increasing frustration and increasingly violent oscillations between moralism and cynicism. ... The weakening of government in an effort to reform it could lead eventually to strong demands for the replacement of the weakened and ineffective institutions by more authoritarian structures more effectively designed to meet historical needs."
Is this the direction in which we are going? It does seem to be the direction in which we have been going and from which we find it harder and harder to extricate ourselves. American history (and the wider history of the Western world) offer multiple resources for us to draw upon - as well as abundant examples of opportunities missed roads that failed to be taken when the possibility was sitll open. Meanwhile the scenario Huntington feared most - an increasing embrace of anti-creedal authoritarian structures - seems increasingly realistic. As i wrote in 2024, Huntington may have predicted better than he knew.
