Magnifica Humanitas

On the anniversary of Poe Leo XIII's 1891 groundbreaking social encyclical Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIV signed his first papal encyclical, Magnifica Humanitas (“On the Protection of Human Dignity in the Age of Artificial Intelligence”). The encyclical was publicly presented at the Vatican ten days later, on May 25, during an event which included presentations by Pope Leo himself and, surprisingly, a co-founder of an AI company, Anthropic. Through this encyclical, Pope Leo is following the path of of his predecessor Leo XIII by attempting to respond to today’s technological revolution, as the earlier Leo had to the industrial revolution.

Leo XIII's intervention began a whole series of such encyclicals, which together have come to be called the "encyclical tradition" of "Catholic Social Teaching." Some of those encyclicals, notably Pius XI's Quadragesimo Anno, apparently had actual political and economic effects in influencing the U.S. New Deal. Whether this Pope Leo's intervention - in a very different kind of world - will have a comparable practical effect remains to be seen.

The Pope begins with the irresistibly anti-technological biblical image of the Tower of Babel. One possible moral to take from the Babel story is that such aggressive  technological efforts are intrinsically misguided, if not inherently evil. Leo, however, is no Luddite. He obviously recognizes that AI technology is here to stay, but he tries to envision a world in which AI technologies may be morally tamed by regulation. Hence, his contrary image of Nehemiah, another biblical builder, whose approach Leo invokes as a positive model. Technology for Leo, "is not inherently evil," but neither is it neutral, "because it takes on the characteristics of those who devise, finance, regulate and use it" [9].

Seeking to situate himself in the tradition of which he seeks to represent a continuation, Leo reviews in some detail the 135-year history of the modern Church's Social Doctrine. Certainly for many secular readers (and perhaps for many Catholics as well), this review, which is really a mini-compendium of the Church's Social Doctrine, will be necessary, for it forms an essential preliminary for what follows. Highlighted are the tradition's emphasis on "the dignity of the person, the value of work, the universal destination of goods, solidarity and subsidiarity, care for creation and the centrality of peace and fraternity" [45]. Leo describes the principle of the common good "as the social expression of the dignity recognized in every person" [59]. This all-important principle of the common good cannot be reduced to the "total of individual benefits, nor the intersection of their particular interests; it is a greater good that belongs to everyone, and it can only be achieved nurtured and protected by our collective efforts" [60]. "Politics should promote this common good, not "short-term calculations or sterile polarizations" [63]. The injunction is welcome, but probably needs to be complemented by a realistic reflection on the problem of democracy, which inevitably seems to prioritize the short-term over the long-term and private interests over the common good.

Another essential social doctrine principle is "the universal destination of goods." Private property the encyclical reminds us "is always subordinate to the universal destination fo goods." The "social function" of private property, the Pope insists, "must not be considered a mere theological opinion, but a doctrine of the Church" [66]. This doctrinal development must certainly be taken as a challenge to certain strains especially in American Catholicism.

Subsidiarity (which, one may suggest, is often, especially in the U.S., the most commonly misapplied principle of the Church's social vocabulary) sets certain limits on the State. But in the new digital context, "the highest level is not the State, but rather major economic and technological actors that exercise de facto power over the conditions of everyday life." Here the encyclical calls for "transparency, accountability, and meaningful forms of participation" [71]. The necessary complement to subsidiarity is solidarity. "When subsidiarity is not linked to solidarity, it ends up becoming merely the protection of particular interests; when solidarity is not supported by subsidiarity it degenerates in to a form of welfare that does not promote responsibility" [73].

Social justice is "characterized by the capacity of a social, economic and political order to allow everyone - particularly the weakest - to live a truly dignified life, without leaving anyone behind. ... A litmus test for social justice today is the treatment of migrants, refugees and those forced to move due to poverty, violence, climate change and environmental disasters" [77, 81].

Chapter three takes on the technological paradigm and digital power and memorably quotes Romano Guardini, "contemporary man has not been trained to use power well" [[93]. Here, he finally draws the necessary distinction between human and artificial intelligence. AI's "power remains entirely tied to data processing. So-called artificial intelligences do not undergo experiences, do not possess a body, do not feel joy or pain, do not mature through relationships and do not know from within what love, work, friendship or responsibility mean. Nor do they have a moral conscience, since they do not judge good and evil, grasp the ultimate meaning of situations, or bear responsibility for consequences. ... they do not understand what they produce, for they lack the affective, relational and spiritual perspective through whcih human beings grow in wisdom" [99].

Accordingly, "AI can be a valuable tool," but requires "a measured and vigilant approach," for "every technical tool embodies choices and priorities through what it measures, ignores and optimizes, and how it classifies people and situations" [100, 104]. Unfortunately, there is an "imbalance between the speed of technological growth and the slower development of awareness, norms, safeguards and institutions capable of governing its effects" [106] "What is needed is a more active political involvement that is capable of slowing things down when everything is accelerating, and of protecting the opportunities for communities still to be able to participate and ask questions" [107].

Hence, his most memorable phrase from the entire encyclical: Disarming AI. This "means discrediting the assumption that technical power automatically confers the right to govern. ... merely regulating it is insufficient; it. must be disarmed" [110]. Whether societies and governments will in fact act to "disarm" AI or even moderately regulate it is, it must be said, a matter for political action and will depend upon the mobilization of political will. Hopefully, the encyclical's rather radical rhetoric will energize some of that elusive political will!

The "central question" the Pope poses is "what does it mean to safeguard our humanity?" He warns of a "pervasive technocratic paradigm" which "threatens to normalize an anti-human vision," in which "the fullness of life is equated with having more, reducing weakness, eliminating uncertainty and exerting total control" [112] "If the. human being is treated as something to be perfected or surpassed, it becomes easier to accept that some lives are less useful, les desirable or less worthy" [117]. Thus, "the true alternative" is "between two paths of development: a progress that serves individuals and peoples, or a progress that subjects them to the mentality of power" [129]. throughout the encyclical, the Pope keeps his focus not on the technology but on the human person who is impacted by technology - and, it is hoped, may in turn impact it. (Hence, the encyclical's title is not Artificial Intelligence, but “On the Protection of Human Dignity in the Age of Artificial Intelligence.”)

Chapter Four addresses this issue of safeguarding humanity in this time of transition. "In light of the principles of the Church's Social Doctrine, the digital transformation invites us to rediscover truth as a common good, to protect the dignity of work and to safeguard freedom against all forms of dependence and commercialization" [131]. In an observation that cannot but help seeming especially timely today, the encyclical warns that "When questions about what is true lose their appeal, and a pragmatism takes hold that is content with what appears useful or effective, then democratic life is weakened" [134]. Whether democracy is actually up to the challenge of responding to the technological transformation that is taking place is obviously an open question, the answer to which is as yet far from certain.

While concerned not to "demonize" technology, the encyclical also highlights harms associated with digital media that have already commanded attention in today's society and the challenge facing contemporary education: "a culture of immediacy and hyper-stimulation, which gives rise to fatigue, boredom and apathy concerning the effort required for seeking the truth" [139]. 

Following in the tradition of Rerum Novarum, Leo emphasizes the intrinsic importance of work. As is already well known (and was mentioned by the Anthropic executive at the Vatican event), one of the great fears popularly associated with AI technologies is the loss of many jobs. Hence, the significance of Pope Leo's citing Pope Saint John Paul II's 1981 assertion in Laborem Exercens, "unemployment is a grave evil" [151]. The Church "insists that access to work for all must be a high priority for public policies and economic processes, serving as a criterion for evaluating the human quality of any development model" [155]. Interestingly, the encyclical  cites the U.S. Bishops on the importance of work for identity, friendships, relationships, practical responsibilities, and vocation discernment [167].

This leads to a discussion of the dangerous manipulation of persons as objects and warns against currents that "envision 'second-class' human beings, subordinate to the interests of elites who consider themselves superior" [172]. This is the context for the. encyclical's reexamination of slavery, "a wound in Christian memory, one from which we cannot consider ourselves detached" [176]. One reason for this facing up to the sins of past history is to serve as "a call to vigilance," in which what has been learned from the past "must be translated into discernment and responsibility in the present" [177].

Chapter Five addresses the issue of war, which in this context acquires a special salience, "the risk that technology, detached from ethics and responsibility, will render decisions about life and death more rapid and impersonal" [182]. From this understandable concern with the impact of new technologies upon warfare, the encyclical then meanders somewhat into a wider discussion of all contemporary conflict and an apparent perception on the Pope's part "that humanity is slipping onto a violent culture of power, where peace no longer appears as a responsibility to be taken on, but as a fragile interval between conflicts." This leads to a statement which will surely be controversial (and also seems somewhat self-contradictory), that "without prejudice to the right of self-defense in the strictest sense, it is important to reaffirm the 'just war' theory, which has all too often been used to. justify any kind of war, is now outdated" [192]. If the first part of that controversial sentence is taken seriously, then unconditional surrender and pacifism are not a universal moral mandate, in which case how can just war (intended as one moral alternative to unconditional surrender) be "outdated"? Likewise, the encyclical calls "erroneous" the "belief that nuclear deterrence is an indispensable prerequisite for security" [194]. Obviously, it is not "indispensable," in that there may well be other avenues to achieving security. How, however, apart from the successful consequence of nuclear deterrence, does one explain the empirical historical fact that the Cold War remained cold and did not end in another actual world war on the scale of the 1940s? And then there is also the exemplary sad case of Ukraine, which gave up its nuclear deterrent and has since been invaded, something which would almost certainly not have occurred had it retained its nuclear deterrent. Hopefully, concerns about these controversial expressions will not detract from the encyclical's larger arguments that speak with such directness and relevance. .

Thus, the encyclical's concern for the larger question of violence versus peace-making laments a contemporary climate in which "nihilism and pragmatism become intertwined and end up normalizing grave errors. Religious extremism and identity-based fanaticism ally themselves with irrational economic policies, while politics often turns to misinformation and ridiculing opponents, and systematically cultivating fears and resentments" [206]. Commendably, the encyclical challenges individuals themselves and emphasizes our responsibility to "examine our conscience regarding the words we use, the prejudices we have and the explicit or implicit aggression that lies within them" [214]. 

Having systematically addressed this multitude of theoretical and practical concerns, Pope Leo returns at the encyclical's end to the fundamental context of Christian faith. "At the heart of everything is the mystery of the Incarnation, the Word who became flesh and dwelt among us" [231]. "In Christ, we are called to cooperate in the work of creation, rather than be disinterested observers of technological processes that limit our freedom and responsibility. The dignity inscribed in each of us by the Holy Spirit can also be seen in our capacity to reflect critically, choose and love freely, and form authentic relationships" [233].

In conclusion, Leo recalls again the image of Nehemiah, in whom the Pope sees "a striking parable of our own vocation, which is not to be passive spectators of social and cultural fractures, nor mere commentators on what is crumbling, but men and women prepared to enter the construction sites of history ... in order to build what has collapsed and protect what is threatened" [241].

Like Leo XIII before him, Pope Leo XIV has recognized in this encyclical the challenge of "new things" in our time and has presented the Church and the wider world with an agenda for reform, renewal, and revitalization. Had the earlier Leo's response to the social crisis of the 19th-century been taken more seriously by secular society, the history of the 20th century might well have been very different. Magnifica Humanitas represents a serious religious response to some of the latest "new things" that appear as clouds darkening the horizon of this 21st century. The Tower of Babel image which Pope Leo has invoked ought to frighten us, for the Tower of Babel was one of primeval humanity's great mistakes, as AI technologies might well prove to be one of humanity's serious mistakes. The Tower of Babel's construction was halted, although not without irreversible damage to the unity of the human race. Unlike the Tower of Babel, it is hard to image AI actually being stopped. The best that probably can be aspired to is a reassertion of human initiative - much as God restored divine initiative at Babel. Magnifica Humanitas has ably highlighted both this challenge and the dire consequences that lurk in the event of human failure to respond socially and politically with the required reassertion of human initiative.