Facing the new Anxieties is the subtitle of a fascinating new book, The Future of Capitalism (HarperCollins, 2018). Its author, Paul Collier, is a development economist at Oxford University, who brings his personal experience (born and raised in Sheffield and living and working in Africa) to analyze the geographical, educational, and moral crises created by contemporary capitalism. While he sees himself, thanks in part to his personal life- experiences, as wanting to bridge those three divides, he worries that left and right have "each drifted away from their origins in the practical reciprocity of communities, and became captured by an entirely different group of people who became disproportionately influential: middle-class intellectuals."
(In making this argument, he also relies on Jonathan Haidt's now familiar typology of six major human values and the contemporary shriveling of elite values primarily to just two of them.)
The core of his concern is the loss of that "practical reciprocity of communities," in which rights and obligations are firmly linked, in opposition to which left and right both have "in common and emphasis upon the individual, and a fondness for meritocracy," in which "superstars of the left became the very good" while "those of the right became the very rich."
Variations of this social-democratic argument are by now familiar - all rooted in the success of "social democracy" from 1945 to 1970. In that era, which I personally can well remember, capitalism was somehow directed, to some degree at least, to serve the common good. That post-war quarter century "experienced the rapidly rising prosperity achieved by states that pruposively harnessed capitalism for the benefit of society." Contemporary capitalism, however, has, he believes, become "morally bankrupt and on track for tragedy," its rationale built on a theoretical construct, "economic man," who is "selfish, greedy, lazy" and "utterly despicable." Basing himself on Adam Smith's arguments in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Collier focuses instead on a construct of "social man," motivated as much by "oughts" as well as "wants."
The bulk of the book applies these principles to the formation of ethical families, firms, and states. Given the present crisis of civilization, I found his analysis of the "ethical state" especially compelling.
Collier reminds us (again) that, from 1945 to 1970, "we experienced the rapidly rising prosperity achieved by states that purposively harnessed capitalism for the benefit of society." He reminds us because "it wasn't always like that, and it isn't now." By this he refers to how states failed in the 1930s because they "lacked the sense of ethical purpose to see full employment as their responsibility," After the war, came what he calls "the economic miracle" of 1945-1970. Since then, however, states are failing once again: "as our societies have become more divided, they have become less generously disposed to those on the other side of the divide."
World War II was "an immense common endeavour in which leaders had crafted narratives of belonging and mutual obligation," which turned nations into gigantic communities "with a strong sense of shared identity, obligation and reciprocity," in which people were willing "to comply with social democratic narratives that linked individual actions to collective consequences." Over time, however, "Utilitarian and Rawlsian vanguards" failed to renew the legacy of shared identity. So mutual obligation eroded, even as economic changes were making it that much more necessary. Meanwhile successful social elites have been"exiting the shared identity of nation," generating resentment among those they are leaving behind. Since, however, "the nation is the largest feasible entity of shared identity," Collier calls for a renewed "sense of belonging to place."
After analogous analyses of what he calls the ethical firm, the ethical family, and the ethical world, he addresses the geographical divide , the class divide, and the global divide, the predominant contemporary pattern of successful winner and left behind losers, he proposes some practical political reforms aimed at repairing our dysfunctional broken politics - proposals as diverse as reforming the way political parties select their leaders to restoring a lost sense of mutual obligation.so recently "supplanted by the entitled individual." Explicitly referencing our present state of affairs, he concludes that "by eschewing shared belonging," liberals have recklessly "handed it to the charlatan extremes, who are gleefully twisting it to their own warped purposes."
(In making this argument, he also relies on Jonathan Haidt's now familiar typology of six major human values and the contemporary shriveling of elite values primarily to just two of them.)
The core of his concern is the loss of that "practical reciprocity of communities," in which rights and obligations are firmly linked, in opposition to which left and right both have "in common and emphasis upon the individual, and a fondness for meritocracy," in which "superstars of the left became the very good" while "those of the right became the very rich."
Variations of this social-democratic argument are by now familiar - all rooted in the success of "social democracy" from 1945 to 1970. In that era, which I personally can well remember, capitalism was somehow directed, to some degree at least, to serve the common good. That post-war quarter century "experienced the rapidly rising prosperity achieved by states that pruposively harnessed capitalism for the benefit of society." Contemporary capitalism, however, has, he believes, become "morally bankrupt and on track for tragedy," its rationale built on a theoretical construct, "economic man," who is "selfish, greedy, lazy" and "utterly despicable." Basing himself on Adam Smith's arguments in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Collier focuses instead on a construct of "social man," motivated as much by "oughts" as well as "wants."
The bulk of the book applies these principles to the formation of ethical families, firms, and states. Given the present crisis of civilization, I found his analysis of the "ethical state" especially compelling.
Collier reminds us (again) that, from 1945 to 1970, "we experienced the rapidly rising prosperity achieved by states that purposively harnessed capitalism for the benefit of society." He reminds us because "it wasn't always like that, and it isn't now." By this he refers to how states failed in the 1930s because they "lacked the sense of ethical purpose to see full employment as their responsibility," After the war, came what he calls "the economic miracle" of 1945-1970. Since then, however, states are failing once again: "as our societies have become more divided, they have become less generously disposed to those on the other side of the divide."
World War II was "an immense common endeavour in which leaders had crafted narratives of belonging and mutual obligation," which turned nations into gigantic communities "with a strong sense of shared identity, obligation and reciprocity," in which people were willing "to comply with social democratic narratives that linked individual actions to collective consequences." Over time, however, "Utilitarian and Rawlsian vanguards" failed to renew the legacy of shared identity. So mutual obligation eroded, even as economic changes were making it that much more necessary. Meanwhile successful social elites have been"exiting the shared identity of nation," generating resentment among those they are leaving behind. Since, however, "the nation is the largest feasible entity of shared identity," Collier calls for a renewed "sense of belonging to place."
After analogous analyses of what he calls the ethical firm, the ethical family, and the ethical world, he addresses the geographical divide , the class divide, and the global divide, the predominant contemporary pattern of successful winner and left behind losers, he proposes some practical political reforms aimed at repairing our dysfunctional broken politics - proposals as diverse as reforming the way political parties select their leaders to restoring a lost sense of mutual obligation.so recently "supplanted by the entitled individual." Explicitly referencing our present state of affairs, he concludes that "by eschewing shared belonging," liberals have recklessly "handed it to the charlatan extremes, who are gleefully twisting it to their own warped purposes."
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