Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in a book from 1981, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Harvard U. Pr.), by the then political scientist and Harvard Professor of International Affairs, Samuel P. Huntington (1927-2008), author most famously of Political order in Changing Societies (1968) and The Clash of Civilizations? (1993). In 1981, I was at the end of my political science career, and I somehow managed to miss American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, an omission I have now at last corrected.
When on sabbatical at Windsor Castle in 2005 and on other occasions when explaining (or, at least, trying) to explain “American Exceptionalism” to foreigners, I have usually fallen back on the distinction between ethnically identified nation states (e.g., France, Germany, Italy, etc.) and the very different civic identity of the United States, something Samuel Huntington in this prescient book calls our American creedal identity. By the “American Creed,” Huntington has in mind certain basic values and ideas - such as those articulated in the Declaration of Independence and other classic American expressions – which are widely and broadly endorsed by most Americans and which have continued for over 200 years to occupy a central place in American National identity. Particularly prominent among these creedal values, according to Huntington, are the 18th-century value of liberty and the 19th-century value of equality, with the former generally accorded precedence by Americans.
Huntington highlights the high degree of consensus among Americans with regard to the values of this creed, with the broadest consensus “among those more active in the system and who benefit the most from it.” The failure of any serious socialist movement in the U.S. “is perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the preponderance of liberal-democratic values in America.”
Of particular significance for Huntington is how “all the varying elements in the American Creed unite in imposing limits on power and on the institutions of government.”
Of course, there is an inevitable gap between the ideals of the American creed and actual reality. This gap – more precisely, the varied ways Americans respond to this cognitive dissonance - is the basis for much of Huntington’s analysis. “Cleavage in the United States thus does not take the form of idea versus idea as in Europe, but rather of idea versus fact.”
Huntington identifies four responses to this cognitive dissonance - moralistic reform ("eliminating the gap"), cynicism ("tolerating the gap"), complacency ("ignoring the gap"), and hypocrisy ("denying the gap"). Presciently, in terms of subsequent political history (and recent elections), he notes that those "who have less income and less
Huntington's emphasis is mainly on the periods of moralistic reforms, what he calls "creedal passion periods," which occur periodically through American history. He identifies four such periods in particular: the American Revolution, the Jacksonian era, the Progressive era, and the 1960s-1970s. "The Revolutionary era was the prototypical period of creedal passion. The three later periods represented a rearticulation of the themes of the Revolutionary years and a replay of the features and patterns of Revolutionary politics." The general direction of these efforts was "to make political institutions more responsive, more liberal, more democratic."
With certain exceptions, the great reforms in American political history have been associated with these periods, which seem to have occurred at approximately 60-year intervals. Reforms have not, however, been unambiguously successful. "The reforms of one generation often produce the vested interests of the next."
Another theme to which the author gives some attention is religion. "Not only was America born equal and hence did not have to become so, but it was also born Protestant and hence did not have to become so." The lack of establishment reinforced the weakening of the state, while strengthening religion.
Bringing his analysis forward, Huntington foresaw several possibilities. First, the core creedal values, which derive from the 17th and 18th centuries, could "come to be seen as increasingly irrelevant in a complex modern economy and a threatening international environment," an irrelevance potentially exacerbated by rising secularism. Second, the transition to post-industrial society could be accompanied by an increasingly "communitarian" ideology, in place of Lockean individualism. Third, the increasing influence of recent immigrants could also dilute that Lockean tradition. Finally, having been in existence as a nation for over 200 years, what Huntington calls "the ideational basis of national identity" might "be replaced by an organic one." In his book, Huntington did not foresee these developments occurring in the late 20th century. Given the changes that have characterized the first quarter of the 21st century, however, Huntington's concerns appear to have much more relevant merit.
Huntington was also veery prescient in considering future possibilities for the traditional pattern of American creedal movements. One possibility would be continuity, with "a major sustained creedal passion period" occurring in the second and third decades of this century (in other words, now). A second possibility would be a stabilizing greater acceptance of this cognitive dissonance. Finally, the third possibility, which he considered the most dangerous one, may also be the most relevant for our present predicament. Huntington notes "the continued presence of deeply felt moralistic sentiments among major groups in American society could continue to ensure weak and divided government, devoid of authority and unable to deal satisfactorily with the economic, social, and foreign challenges confronting the nation. Intensification of this conflict between history and progress could give rise to increasing frustration and increasingly violent oscillations between moralism and cynicism. ... The weakening of government in an effort to reform it could lead eventually to strong demands for the replacement of the weakened and ineffective institutions by more authoritarian structures more effectively designed to meet historical needs."
A lot has happened in this country since the las creedal passion period in the 1960s and 1970s, which was the immediate background for Huntington's work. It remains to be seen which of his predictions may come to pass and exactly how under these new political conditions. Meanwhile the scenario Huntington feared most - an increasing embrace of anti-creedal authoritarian structures - seems increasingly realistic. Huntinton may have predicted better than he knew.
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